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choices from both defined benefit and 401(k) plans. A minority of respondents plan to take the nondefault options, highlighting the importance of framing. Additionally, higher financial literacy is associated
with lower rates of annuitization in both plans. We explore how participants change their planned
distribution choices after attending seminars that enhance financial knowledge and understanding of
retirement plans.
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Chapter 3
Pension Plan Distributions: The Importance
of Financial Literacy
Robert L. Clark, Melinda S. Morrill, and Steven G. Allen

The disposition of retirement assets is one of the most important and
long-lasting decisions that retiring workers confront. If employees are
covered by a traditional defined benefit (DB) plan, the default option is
that they receive a life annuity that begins when they leave the firm or reach
the plan’s retirement age. However, many DB plans offer workers the
option of receiving a lump sum distribution at retirement, roughly equal
to the present value of the annuity.1 Typically, this is a one-time option that
the worker must make upon termination. If the lump sum is selected,
retirees cannot subsequently decide that they want the annuity. Of course,
they could subsequently purchase a private annuity, but this process would
likely result in the individual bearing higher costs and administrative fees.
Similarly, in cash balance plans, workers must be given a choice of a life
annuity or a lump sum payment.2
Workers with defined contribution (DC) plans such as a 401(k), 403(b),
or 457 face a similar choice in whether to accept a lump sum or purchase a
life annuity, but the distributional choice is framed differently.3 In these
plans, retirees know the value of their accounts and must decide how to
allocate these funds over the retirement period. The difference in how
pension benefits are reported or framed may influence the distribution
decision by retiring workers. This chapter considers what factors appear to
shape worker preferences to elect the nondefault options and request
alternative forms of distributions from their DB and DC plans.
Standard economic theory predicts that actuarially fair annuitization
of assets would be welfare-enhancing for risk-averse individuals, as it provides
a hedge against longevity risk and outliving one’s assets. However, in the
United States and elsewhere, relatively few people voluntarily purchase annuities in the open market.4 A variety of authors have attempted to explain
this tendency of retirees to opt for lump sum distributions from retirement
saving accounts by expanding the economic model and by appealing to the
concept that how the choice is framed determines whether retirees select
annuities as opposed to lump sum distributions.5 Nevertheless, few studies
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have examined the lump sum choice in DB plans as a component of
retirement income planning.6 In this chapter, we examine active workers’
plans for pension distributions from both DB and DC plans. Thus, we are able
to explore two different ways the pension distribution choice is framed.
For DB plans, the default option is an annuity. We find that only 30 percent
of individuals plan to take a lump sum distribution of their pension. On the
other hand, the DC plans default to a lump sum, and we find that only
22 percent plan to annuitize. In addition to describing the individual choices,
we are able to assess how individuals combine these two choices.
The choice of the form of distribution will necessarily be based on the
individual’s financial literacy and knowledge of retirement programs. This
chapter examines pension plan distributions using survey data from two
large employers. These data are a part of a new unique dataset that we
have developed based on surveys of participants in retirement planning
seminars provided by employers to retirement-eligible employees. Using
these data, we estimate whether the older workers are currently planning to
take a lump sum distribution from their DB plan and whether they plan
to annuitize some or all of their account balances in their DC plans. The
analysis focuses on the role of financial literacy in the choice of benefits
and how this choice changes after the seminar.

Economics of choosing between an annuity
and a lump sum
Researchers call the low demand for annuities the ‘annuity puzzle’ and
have put forward a number of reasons why individuals might prefer lump
sum distributions to annuities. One possible explanation for this seemingly
suboptimal choice is the availability of other sources of annuity income,
such as Social Security, that may represent a large percentage of total
wealth for many retirees. Other reasons that individuals might prefer
lump sum distributions include spouses and close relatives with whom
risks can be shared, the bequest motive, and concern about large and
lumpy future expenditures (especially those associated with health care
expenses). Retirees may also worry about rising prices and a fixed retirement income associated with the annuity.
More recently, several studies have suggested that the framing of the
annuity choice tends to influence whether individuals purchase annuities.
Hu and Scott (2007) posit that the way individuals view annuities drives
their decision to purchase an annuity. They refer to this as mental accounting and conclude that the ‘most important potential reason for annuities
being unpopular is mental accounting’; further, this mental accounting
can lead retirees to believe that purchasing an annuity is a gamble that
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increases risk (Hu and Scott, 2007: 18). Brown et al. (2008) suggest that
there are two possible ways of viewing annuities: the ‘consumption frame’,
which focuses on consumption over time, and the ‘investment frame’,
which allows individuals to consider that the total payout is dependent on
survival years and thus makes annuities a risky investment. Small-scale
experiments (Agnew and Szykman, 2011) indicate that if the choice is
put in a consumption frame, individuals will select the annuity; however,
if the choice is put in an investment frame, individuals will prefer a lump
sum distribution of assets into saving accounts.
Most of the literature focuses on the utilization of funds in retirement
saving accounts or other assets that individuals have as they enter retirement.
In other words, the question is what decision retirees make in purchasing an
annuity with these funds, versus retaining control of their assets and gradually drawing them down to finance consumption in retirement. However, a
related decision confronts many individuals who have DB plans. By law, DB
plans offer retirees a life annuity, but plan sponsors can also include other
choices such as lump sum distributions. Accordingly, this choice should be
considered as part of the demand for life annuities facing many retirees.
Examining the distributions from both types of plans allows us to examine
the importance of how the choice is framed compared to other potential
determinants of how retirement funds are accessed and managed.
The data set we use for the analyses was developed to examine the effectiveness of employer-provided financial education and pre-retirement planning
programs. The Participants Attending Retirement Seminars (PARS) dataset
is based on approximately ninety seminars held in 2008 and 2009 across the
country by six large employers. Over 1,000 participants completed a survey
before and after the seminars. Participants completed a detailed survey
before and after the seminar, including information on their own (and their
spouses’) economic and demographic information. Participants were also
asked about their retirement plans, including whether they planned to take
a lump sum distribution from their DB plan (i.e., decline the annuity and
accept a lump sum payment), and whether they would annuitize some or all of
their account balances in their DC accounts. Retirement-eligible employees
were invited to participate in these programs, which ranged from a half-day
to two days in duration.7
In this chapter, we focus on the two firms with the largest samples,
seminar participants at Progress Energy and Becton, Dickinson and Company (BD). Sample means, shown in Table 3A.1, indicate that the average
age was 58, the sample was 58 percent male, and 78 percent of respondents
were married. These employees had an average of 27 years of service and
almost half had college degrees. All were covered by a DB plan and all had
access to a DC plan. Interestingly, 40 percent of the respondents planned
on working after they retired from their current jobs. In general, this was a

Comp. by: PG3754
Stage : Revises1
ChapterID: 0001296834
Time:19:06:39
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001296834.3D

Date:24/8/11

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 24/8/2011, SPi

Pension Plan Distributions: The Importance of Financial Literacy

43

relatively high-income sample of older workers who were wealthier than
average and who reported that they were in good health.
Employees were asked if their employer allowed them to take a lump sum
distribution from their DB plan and if so, did they currently plan on opting
for the lump sum. Prior to the seminar, just less than 30 percent reported
intending to take a lump sum distribution of their pension, and this
number dropped to 28 percent after attending. In addition, participants
were asked whether they planned to annuitize some or all of the funds
in their DC accounts. Prior to the seminar, approximately 22 percent
reported planning to annuitize their DC plans; the fraction increased to
29 percent after the seminar. Next, we explore the determinants of these
choices and characteristics of individuals that changed plans.

Company benefits and framing the distribution choice
As the two companies in this analysis offered a DB plan, a 401(k) plan, and
retiree medical coverage, the workers clearly had more generous benefits
than many American workers. Both firms allowed retirees the choice of a
lump sum distribution from their DB plan; further, one firm, Progress Energy,
regularly reported account balances equal to the available lump sum distribution. Annuity options were unavailable for the Progress Energy 401(k) plan
but were offered by the BD plan. These differences allow us to consider the
distribution choice in both DB and DC plans and also permit a comparison of
the framing between a traditional DB plan and a cash balance plan.
Progress Energy froze a final average pay pension formula in 2003 and
converted to a cash balance pension formula.8 Annual statements sent to
each employee indicate the annuity they could receive under the old
formula and the account balance in the cash balance plan. At retirement,
there is an annuity value and a lump sum value associated with the old
formula and the new cash balance formula. The pension summary that
individuals receive from Progress Energy at retirement includes the higher
of the two annuity values from the two formulas and the higher of the two
lump sum values of the two formulas. Given that the old formula was frozen
in 2003 and the terms of the transition to the cash balance formula at
the time of the conversion, most individuals who attended the seminars in
2008 and 2009 would have higher values from the cash balance formula.
Payment options include a variety of life annuity options, phased
withdrawals, and a total lump sum distribution. Account balances from
the 401(k) plan could be withdrawn as a total lump sum, the retiree could
specify monthly payouts, the funds could be rolled over to an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA), or the funds could be left in the plan
until a later date. The individual could not purchase an annuity through
the plan, but of course, they could roll the funds over to an IRA

AQ1
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and purchase an annuity through the IRA. Retirees were allowed to remain
in the employer-provided health plan.
BD maintained a final average pay plan with a 1 percent multiplier for
final covered compensation and a 1.5 percent multiplier for final excess
compensation.9 At retirement, individuals had the option of a single life
annuity, several joint and survivor annuities, or a lump sum distribution.
BD also offered a Saving Incentive Plan with a 75 percent match on the first
6 percent of salary contributed by employees. Retirees were also eligible to
remain in the BD health plan.

Choosing a distribution option
To model respondents’ planned distribution choices, we use responses to
two questions in the survey, as described in Table 3A.2. Note that the
wording differed slightly between the two employers for one of the questions. We consider whether workers report planning to make an active
choice of the nondefault option versus responding ‘No’, ‘Have not yet
decided’, or leaving the question blank.
Table 3.1 separates the distributional preferences reported before participants attended the seminar into several categories. The first category
indicates the respondents planned to accept the pension payout in the
form indicated by the default; in other words, to accept an annuity from
the DB plan and take the account balance from the DC plan as a lump sum
payment. Over half reported plans to take the default options, indicating
that the defaults were an important predictor of planning. The next
column indicates plans to take a lump sum distribution from both plans,
that is, to not accept the default annuity from the DB plan and to accept the
default lump sum from the DC plan. Twenty-two percent of all respondents
reported planning to elect the lump sum of both.
The third column represents respondents planning to take annuities from
both their DB and DC retirement plans. This group reported planning to
accept the default annuity from the DB plan and also annuitize the account
balance in the 401(k) plan. Fourteen percent of respondents reported
having these plans. Finally, the fourth column indicates respondents indicating they would take the non-default option in both plans. This combination
of pension distributions was planned by 8 percent of these older workers.
This group indicated they would annuitize the account balance in the 401(k)
plan and take a lump sum distribution from the DB plan. The proportion of
workers planning to select a lump sum distribution of their pension assets is
broadly consistent with the rates reported by Hurd and Panis (2006) for the
respondents in the Health and Retirement Survey.
Next, we report the percentages of each group that elect each of the
possible disposition combinations described above. The significance levels
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Table 3.1 Disposition choices by respondent characteristics (%)

Full sample

Percent
of sample

Default
options

100

Lump sum
Annuitize
(DB choice) (DC choice)

Nondefault
choice

56.1

21.8

14.4

Progress Energy

38

61.9**

13.1***

19.1***

7.7
5.9

BD

62

52.6**

27.1***

11.5***

8.9

Women

42

60.9**

22.1

12.0

Men

58

52.8**

21.5

16.0

9.7**

Married

78

52.9***

22.6

15.4

9.1**

Not married

22

67.4***

18.8

10.9

2.9**

Some college

47

56.7

24.6

11.6*

7.2

High school

53

55.7

19.3

16.8*

8.3

Years of service <20

22

64.7**

19.9

8.8**

6.6

Years of service 20+

78

53.7**

22.3

15.9**

8.1

5**

Notes: Statistical significance of differences are within the two categories, where * indicates significance at
the 10 percent level,
** is 5 percent, and
*** is 1 percent. The sample consists of all respondents that completed surveys and answered at least five
out of the nine knowledge questions in both surveys 1 and 2 (no more than four blanks allowed). The
sample also excludes individuals with missing values for birth year, education, job tenure, marital status, and
sex. The sample is restricted to individuals born between 1943 and 1959. The planned choices represented
here are all reported by respondents prior to attending the seminar. Data are from surveys conducted by the
authors in 2008 and 2009. The total number of observations is 620.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

reported indicate differences in means between the groups. Employees at
Progress Energy were more likely to choose the default for both plans and
more likely to choose annuitizing both (i.e., taking the default option for the
DB and annuitizing the DC) than workers at BD. Interestingly, Progress
Energy did not allow for the purchase of an annuity from within the 401(k)
plan, while BD did, yet far more workers at Progress Energy chose to annuitize.
Nevertheless, in the regression analysis reported below there is no statistical
difference in the choice to annuitize some, or all, of one’s retirement saving
plan between workers at Progress Energy and BD once additional controls are
added to the model.
The next row presents the planned distribution choices broken down by
gender. Previous research has found that women are less likely to purchase
annuities, even though they have longer life expectancies, perhaps due to
lower level of financial literacy, or a lack of financial planning. We find that
women are indeed significantly more likely to choose both default options.
In our data, married individuals are significantly less likely to plan to take
the default choices, perhaps due to strategic plans of couples in generating
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a diversified portfolio. Somewhat surprisingly, those without a college
degree were slightly more likely to report planning to annuitize both
their 401(k) and their pension. Individuals with fewer years of service are
not more likely to take a lump sum from their pension but are significantly
less likely to annuitize their 401(k).
Respondents were asked the same questions concerning plan distributions after their retirement planning seminar ended. It is interesting to
observe the changes in retirement plans based on the information presented in the seminar. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate how workers altered
their reported plans. In Figure 3.1, we see that before attending the
seminar 29.5 percent of workers reported planning to take a lump sum
distribution of their DB pension, while 70.5 percent (437 observations)
reported either not wanting to take the lump sum or that they were unsure.
Of the 437 workers that did not plan to take a lump sum distribution from
their DB plan prior to the seminar, 11 percent (forty-nine respondents)
changed to planning to take a lump sum afterwards. Among the forty-nine
respondents that switched plans in this way, forty-nine respondents had
previously said they did not know this option was available. This shift clearly
indicates how a gain in knowledge concerning the options available in
a pension can affect retirement plans. Figure 3.2 presents a similar breakdown of transitions between plans for 401(k) disposition choices. Of the 438
individuals that were not initially reporting plans to purchase an annuity, 22
percent (106 individuals) changed to intending to purchase an annuity.
After seminar

Before seminar

Lump sum of DB
183 (29.5%)

122 (66.7%)

Lump sum of DB
171 (27.6%)

61 (33.3%)

49 (11.2%)
Don’t take lump
sum of DB*
437 (70.5%)

388 (88.8%)

Don’t take lump
sum of DB*
449 (72.4%)

Figure 3.1 How learning affects plans for disposition of employer-provided pensions
Notes : Sample size 620. Data from surveys conducted by the authors in 2008 and
2009. *These cells include those that responded ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’, or left the
question blank.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.
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Before seminar

Annuitize DC
137 (22.1%)

47

After seminar

73 (53.3%)

Annuitize DC
179 (28.9%)

64 (46.7%)

106 (21.9%)
Don’t annuitize
DC*
483 (77.9%)

377 (78.1%)

Don’t annuitize
DC*
441 (71.1%)

Figure 3.2 How learning affects plans for 401(k) disposition choice
Notes: Sample size 620. Data from surveys conducted by the authors in 2008 and
2009. *These cells include those that responded ‘No’, ‘Don’t know’, or left the
question blank.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.

Factors associated with retirement plan
disposition choice
We more formally explore how these factors interact to predict disposition
choice by running a series of multivariate regressions of the choice to take
the nondefault options. The first two columns of Table 3.2 report estimates
of the factors predicting the following plans prior to attending the seminar:
taking a lump sum distribution of one’s pension (Column 1), and purchasing an annuity from one’s retirement saving plan (Column 2). In both
cases, the nondefault option was the choice modeled, so in Column 1, the
individual is reporting a choice not to accept the default of an annuitized
pension, and in Column 2, the individual reports a choice to purchase an
annuity from 401(k) saving.
Interestingly, there is a slightly positive and significant correlation
between the choice to take a lump sum of the DB pension and to annuitize
the 401(k). If plans for distributional choices were based on careful investment planning, we might expect these choices to be negatively correlated;
in other words, a person might desire to have all of his/her retirement
income as a lump sum, or all as an annuity. If framing of the choice was the
main driver of this decision, then the two choices should be positively
related. The cost of annuities in the market and the unbundling of DB
annuities make annuitizing the retirement saving account, while taking
a lump sum distribution from the DB plan makes an unexpected choice.
Perhaps, individuals chose both default options because of a lack of finan-
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Table 3.2 Disposition choices for defined benefit and defined contribution plans

Plan to annuitize 401(k)

DB: choice
to take
lump sum

DC:
choice to
annuitize

DB: choice to
take lump
sum if
previously No
or Don’t know

DC: choice
to annuitize
if previously
No or Don’t
know

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.079
[0.045]

Plan to take lump sum DB

0.069
[0.040]*

Progress Energy

–0.233
[0.040]***

Years of service
Women
Married
College degree

0.004

Total wealth 100k+
DC account 1–5 years’
salary
DC account 5+ years’ salary
Medium health
High health
25–75% survive 75^
75–100% survive 75^
Medium knowledge score^

–0.021
[0.036]

0.095
[0.046]**

–0.001

0.000

0.002

[0.002]**

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.002]

–0.062

–0.062

0.061

0.014

[0.043]

[0.044]

[0.033]*

[0.045]

0.065

0.057

0.026

0.020

[0.047]

[0.043]

[0.035]

[0.047]

0.025

–0.090

–0.020

–0.055

[0.036]**

[0.036]

[0.044]

[0.038]
Total wealth 25–100k

0.034
[0.043]

0.006

–0.032

–0.036

0.099

[0.046]

[0.046]

[0.038]

[0.052]*

0.078

–0.053

–0.016

0.075

[0.047]*

[0.044]

[0.039]

[0.047]

0.009

0.055

–0.099

0.009

[0.063]

[0.054]

[0.064]

[0.063]

0.036

0.069

–0.038

–0.088

[0.075]

[0.065]

[0.074]

[0.073]

0.107

–0.046

0.046

–0.044

[0.057]*

[0.056]

[0.039]

[0.065]

–0.003

–0.008

0.053

0.028

[0.058]

[0.060]

[0.044]

[0.069]

–0.044

–0.051

–0.046

0.097

[0.076]

[0.071]

[0.067]

[0.063]

–0.013

–0.033

–0.043

0.117

[0.078]

[0.072]

[0.072]

[0.065]*

0.166

–0.002

0.030

0.052

[0.040]

[0.040]

[0.050]

[0.042]***
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High knowledge score^

0.107
[0.057]*

Observations
R-squared

620
0.12

–0.103

–0.009

–0.006

[0.050]**

[0.043]

[0.053]

620
0.06

437
0.04

49

438
0.06

Notes: Coefficients are from linear probability models with standard errors in brackets, where * indicates
significance at the 10 percent level,
** is 5 percent, and
*** is 1 percent. Note that all specifications also include the following covariates: age, a constant term, and
indicators for no response for total wealth, DC account balance, own health, and own survival probability.
The dependent variable in Column (1) is whether the individual planned to take a lump sum distribution of
her pension at retirement reported before attending the seminar, and Column (2) is whether the individual
planned to annuitize some or all of her 401(k) account at retirement before attending the seminar. Column
(3) includes only individuals that did not originally report planning to take a lump sum distribution of their
pension, with the dependent variable being a change to reporting after the seminar plans to take a lump
sum of the pension. Column (4) includes only individuals that did not originally report planning to
annuitize some or all of their 401(k) accounts, with the dependent variable being a change to reporting
after the seminar plans to annuitize the 401(k).
^ Indicates variables that are measured before the seminar in Columns (1) and (2) and after the seminar in
Columns (3) and (4). Data are from surveys conducted by the authors in 2008 and 2009.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

cial literacy and/or a lack of understanding of the two plans. This conclusion would suggest that more educational and retirement planning events
would improve choices. It also emphasizes the importance of plan design
and defaults on workers’ choices.
In Column 1 of Table 3.2, we see that, contrary to expectations, individuals at Progress Energy were significantly less likely to choose a lump sum
distribution from their pension, despite the differences between BD and
Progress Energy in the framing of the choice (recall that Progress Energy
had a cash balance plan). On the other hand, for the choice to annuitize
the 401(k) there is no difference between workers at the two firms, even
though BD allowed for annuitization within the plan. The importance of
framing the choice seems to be rather limited, although here we only
consider data from two employers, and the impact of framing may be less
important than other unmeasured differences between these companies.
Next, in Column 1 of Table 3.2 we see that a worker’s tenure at an
employer is positively associated with his/her plans to take a lump sum
distribution from his/her DB plan, although the effect is small in magnitude. Note that years of service is positively related to the size of the
DB pension annual benefit, so that we can interpret this coefficient as
indicating that larger pension amounts lead to higher probabilities of
taking lump sum distributions. Economic theory predicts that it may be
more sensible to take a lump sum distribution from a pension if the total
amount is quite small. Surprisingly, having more years of service is positively related to the probability of taking a lump sum.
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In the first two columns of Table 3.2, there is no statistical difference
along gender or marital status once the additional controls are added.
However, individuals with a college degree are significantly less likely to
plan to annuitize their DC plan relative to their less educated coworkers.
This is a surprising finding if we believe that the benefits of purchasing an
annuity are felt later in life, indicating the plans to purchase an annuity
should be positively associated with patience and risk aversion. However,
it may be the case that those with more education feel that they can manage
their assets more efficiently and therefore prefer not to purchase life
annuities. There is a positive and significant association between having
the highest level of wealth, relative to the lowest, and planning to take a
lump sum of one’s pension.
Annuities may be more valuable to those individuals having private
information indicating a longer than average life expectancy. It may also
be the case that individuals concerned about the potential costs of a sudden
health shock might want to keep some or all assets liquid. Interestingly, with
the exception of being in medium health in Column 1, there is no statistically significant relationship between a respondent’s health or subjective
survival probability and his/her plans to annuitize. These results indicate
that distributional choices are based on something besides a simple present
value calculation and an attempt to insure against longevity risks.
Finally, using a measure of financial knowledge described in the data
appendix, we see that the most knowledgeable individuals are more likely
to report planning to take a lump sum of their pension and less likely to
be planning to annuitize their 401(k). Often lack of financial literacy is
cited to explain why individuals do not purchase annuities or simply
accept the default options. These results indicate that individuals with
the most financial literacy prefer to retain control over their assets. One
limitation of this study is that we do not ask how an individual plans to
invest (or divest) saving in retirement. It may be the case that individuals
are planning to take a lump sum from their pension and roll it over to an
IRA or an alternative retirement account that provides an annuity option.
It may be that the most financially savvy are best able to navigate the
secondary market for annuities.
Column 3 of Table 3.2 presents results from a sample of individuals
who had not intended to take the lump sum distribution of their pension
preseminar. For these individuals, we then model those who change to
reporting plans to take a lump sum from their DB plans after attending
the seminar. Similarly, Column 4 of Table 3.2 reports estimates for the
sample of individuals that did not report intentions to annuitize some or all
of their DC plans prior to the seminar. In that column, we then model the
change after the seminar to planning to annuitize one’s DC plan. When
interpreting the change in intentions, it is important to consider that these
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estimates apply only to the group that previously was planning to accept the
default or had not developed a plan, rather than the entire population of
attendees. Because the questions were asked at the end of the seminar, we
can infer that (except for response error and measurement error inherent
in surveys) respondents were changing their plans due to information they
obtained during the seminar.
The estimates reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.2 indicate that
among participants who initially planned on taking the default option
(or who had not yet decided), the standard economic and demographic
variables are not significantly related to the probability of changing plans
after the seminar. Although in Column 1 we found that workers at Progress
Energy were significantly less likely to report planning to take the lump
sum option from their DB plan prior to the seminar, among those that
were not planning initially we see no difference in the propensity to change
plans between workers at the two companies. Similarly, in Column 2 of
Table 3.2, we found no significant difference between workers at BD and
Progress Energy in their choice to annuitize their DC plans, but we now
find a large and statistically significant effect indicating that workers at
Progress Energy were around 10 percentage points more likely to change
their plans relative to workers at BD regarding the choice to annuitize some
or all of one’s DC plan. This is approximately 50 percent of the total
probability of changing plans (22 percent).
In Column 3 of Table 3.2, we see that women were significantly more
likely to change their plans to take a lump sum from their pension. Higher
wealth was associated with changing plans to annuitize retirement saving,
while higher levels of DC wealth were associated with a reduced probability
of changing plans to annuitize. There is no significant effect of knowledge
on changes in plans, but we do find that individuals with higher life
expectancies were slightly more likely to change plans to annuitize some
or all of their 401(k) account balance after the seminar.

Conclusion
This chapter examined data on retirement-eligible workers from two large
employers, focusing on their preferences for retirement income before
and after their participation in a retirement planning seminar. These two
companies offered workers both DB plans and the opportunity to contribute to 401(k) plans. The employers also allowed workers to remain in the
company health plans in retirement. We show that about three-quarters of
all respondents planned to accept the default option in their retirement
prior to participation in the seminar. Nevertheless, this means that onequarter of the respondents rejected the default and planned to make an

Comp. by: PG3754
Stage : Revises1
ChapterID: 0001296834
Time:19:06:40
Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0001296834.3D

Date:24/8/11

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 24/8/2011, SPi

52

Financial Literacy

active choice to receive their benefit in another form. After the program,
18 percent of participants modified their plans concerning the DB plan
and 28 percent changed their preferred distributional choice for the DC.
Thus, the presentation of material fundamental to making retirement
choices seemed to influence the distributional choices of approximately
one-quarter of retirees. How many workers were influenced by the framing
of the benefit choice is uncertain, as many retirees likely would have chosen
this form of retirement benefit in any case.
The choice between annuitized retirement income or lump sum distributions and self-management is one of the most important decisions a
person will make. Making the right decision requires workers to have
sufficient financial literacy and knowledge of their retirement programs.
Company-provided retirement planning programs can provide information that allows workers to re-evaluate their plans. Many retiring workers
seek to maintain a portion of their retirement assets in accounts that they
can continue to control and spend according to their preferences. While
framing of the distributional choice with annuity defaults can increase
the proportion of retirees selecting an annuity option, simply making an
annuity the first choice is not sufficient to entice many workers to prefer
this type of retirement income.
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Data Appendix
The data are from a survey of workers attending employer-provided preretirement planning seminars during 2008 and 2009. Surveys were
completed immediately before and after the seminar, which enables the
comparison of knowledge and retirement plans before and after acquiring
information at the seminar. We received 431 surveys from BD and 274
from Progress Energy, for a total of 705. Once we restricted the sample to
those answering at least five out of nine knowledge questions (rather than
leaving them blank) in both survey one and two the final sample was 620
observations. Table 3A.1 presents the means for the sample, while Table
3A.2 describes how the key dependent variables are defined. Table 3A.3
describes some covariates used. Table 3A.4 defines the knowledge score.
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Table 3A.1 Respondents’ descriptive statistics
Variable

Before
seminar

Age

58.2

Male (%)

58.4

Married (%)

77.7

Years of service

27.1

College degree (%)

47.3

Plan to work after retirement (%)

39.2

Annual earnings of $50,000–$100,000 (%)

47.7

Annual earnings of $100,000 and over (%)

23.1

Account balance in 401(k)/403(b) plans 1–5 years of earnings (%)

64.5

Account balance in 401(k)/403(b) plans over 5 years of earnings (%)

20.5

Home equity $50,000–$200,000 (%)

46.8

Home equity over $200,000 (%)

32.6

Financial assets $25,000–$100,000 (%)

27.1

Financial assets over $100,000 (%)

35.6

Fair or poor health (%)

12.3

Very good or excellent health (%)

44.7

Postretirement investment strategy: no change (%)

14.4

Postretirement investment strategy: more aggressive (%)

After
seminar

3.5

Planned to take lump sum of pension (%)

29.5

27.6

Planned to annuitize all or part of DC saving (%)

22.1

28.9

5.2

6.3

Percent low knowledge (%)

53.1

26.6

Percent high knowledge (%)

13.4

30.3

Mean knowledge score

Probability of living to 75: 0–24% (%)
Probability of living to 75: 75–100% (%)

8.1

8.3

56.6

51.1

Probability of living to 85: 0–24% (%)

23.1

20.5

Probability of living to 85: 75–100 (%)

28.0

25.4

Number of respondents that were married
Spouse earned more than $50,000 in the past year (%)
Number of observations of valid retirement age before and after
Mean retirement age
Notes : The total number of observations is 620.
Source : Authors’ calculations; see text.

482
24.9
504
62.4

526
62.6
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Table 3A.2 Dependent variable definitions
Dependent
variable

Definition

Survey wording

Response
options

Choice to take a
lump sum of
pension

1: if response is Yes
0: if response is No,
Have not yet
decided, or left blank

[BD:] Do you plan on taking your
entire pension as a lump sum
distribution so that you will not
receive a monthly benefit from the
pension plan?

1: Yes
2: No
3: Have not
yet decided

[Progress Energy:] If your pension
plan allowed lump sum
distributions of some or all of the
pension benefit, would you take this
option when you retire?
Choice to
annuitize some
or all of 401(k)

1: if response is Yes
0: if response is No,
Have not yet
decided, or left blank

Are you planning on buying a life
annuity with your retirement
savings?

1: Yes
2: No
3: Have not
decided

Notes: The survey included a lead-in question which asked the respondent if he/she could take a lump sum
of his/her pension. The actual survey question is as follows: Can you take a lump sum distribution of some
or all of your pension plan (do not include income from your [Savings Incentive Plan/401(k) Plan])?
Answer options were: Yes; No (skip to question 14); Don’t know (skip to question 14).
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

Table 3A.3 Key covariate definitions
Covariate

Question

Responses

Total wealth

What is the total value of the stocks,
bonds, and savings accounts that you own
outside of the retirement plans offered by
BD (include any 401(k), 403(b) or 457
plans or IRAs you have from previous
employers (do not include retirement
plans owned by your spouse or partner)?

1: Less than $25,000
2: $25,001–$50,000
3: $50,001–$75,000
4: $75,001–$100,000
5: $100,001–$250,000
6: Over $250,000

Earnings

Last year, what were your total earnings,
including earnings from BD and any
other payments you may have had from
other employers (do not include income
earned by other members of your
household or income from interest, rents,
or dividends)?

1: Less than $25,000
2: $25,001–$50,000
3: $50,001–$75,000
4: $75,001–$100,000
5: $100,001–$150,000
6: Over $150,000

DC Acct

[BD:] What is the total value of your
Saving Incentive Plan (do not include the
value of retirement plans held by your
spouse or partner)?[Progress Energy:]
What is the total value of the stocks,

1: Less than one year salary
2: One to two years salary
3: Three to five years salary
4: More than five years salary
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bonds, and savings accounts that you own
outside of the retirement plans offered by
your current employer (include any 401
(k), 403(b) or 457 plans or IRAs you have
from previous employers; do not include
retirement plans owned by your spouse or
partner)?
Health

How would you rate your health
generally?

Survive 75

As you plan for retirement, what do you
think the chances are that you will live to
age 75?

1: Poor
2: Fair
3: Good
4: Very good
5: Excellent
1: 0–24%
2: 25–49%
3: 50–74%
4: 75–99%
5: 100%

Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

Table 3A.4 Knowledge score questions
Survey question

Responses

What is the earliest age you can start Social
Security benefits?

62 (correct)

What is the age that you can receive a full or
unreduced Social Security benefit (this is called
the normal retirement age)?

66 (correct)

If you start Social Security benefits at the earliest
possible age, you will receive a benefit that is
_________ percent of the benefit that you would
have received at the normal retirement age

60%
75% (correct)
80%
100%
Don’t know
Benefit decrease is permanent (correct)
Benefit decrease ends when you reach
the normal retirement age
Don’t know

Is the reduction in Social Security benefits for
early retirement permanent or does the
reduction end when you reach the normal
retirement age?
After you start receiving Social Security benefits,
these benefits are:

The same for the rest of my life
Are increased annually by the rate of
inflation (correct)
Are increased annually but by less than the
rate of inflation
Are increased annually but by more
than the rate of inflation
Don’t know
65 (Correct)
(continued )
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Table 3A.4 Continued
Survey question

Responses

What is the earliest age that you will be eligible
for Medicare?
Do you think the following statement is true or
false? ‘Buying a single company stock usually
provides a safer return than a diversified
portfolio.’

True
False (Correct)

Assume that your retirement income increases
by 2 percent per year and that the annual rate of
inflation is 4 percent per year. After one year, will
you be able to:

Buy more goods and services with your
increased income
Buy fewer goods and services with your
increased income (correct)
Buy exactly the same amount of goods
and services with your increased
income
Don’t know

Does (your company) offer you the opportunity
to stay in the company health plan after you
retire?

Yes (correct)
No
Don’t know

Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

Endnotes
1

2

3

The US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 1990) reported that in 1989 only
2 percent of DB plans offered by medium and large firms gave workers the option
of taking a lump sum distribution, but by 1997, the proportion of these firms with
plans that included a lump sum distribution had risen to 23 percent (BLS, 1999;
also see Moore and Muller, 2002). Data from the National Compensation Survey
indicated that 48 percent of workers covered by a DB plan in 2003 and 52 percent
in 2007 were in plans that provided employees with the option of selecting a lump
sum distribution instead of accepting the life annuity (BLS, 2005, 2007; Purcell,
2009).
Lump sum distributions from DB plans are calculated using an interest rate to
determine the present value of the promised life annuity. The interest rate used
by the plan to make this conversion may not be equal to an individual’s discount
rate. Thus, retiring workers can assess whether the lump sum equivalent is worth
more or less than that of the life annuity in utility terms.
Ameriks (2002) provides evidence of the desire for lump sum distributions
among individuals in DC plans by examining the response of participants in
TIAA-CREF to a change in its distributional policy. Prior to 1989, TIAA-CREF
required participants to annuitize their account balances. After this restriction
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was removed, the proportion of participants electing life annuities fell to 46
percent in 2001.
An exception to this observation seems to be the behavior of retirees in Switzerland. Avanzi (2009) reports that almost two-thirds of the Swiss converted all of
their retirement assets into annuities, while only one-fourth requested that all of
the assets be paid as a lump sum.
Mitchell et al. (1999), Johnson et al. (2004) and Brown (2008) provide in-depth
reviews of these and other reasons why so few individuals purchase annuities to
help smooth consumption in retirement. Individuals may also have better information concerning their life expectancy than the actuarial calculation. Thus, the
value of an annuity to an individual might differ from the offer price. For
individuals with poor health or lower life expectancies, the price of the annuity
may be too high and it would be optimal to select a lump sum distribution. In fact,
sellers facing unknown longevity of the population willing to purchase annuities
may price the product too high for the average retiree (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990). Davidoff et al. (2005) provide a formal model that explains the
lack of demand for annuities in this way.
Much of the research examining lump sum distributions from DB plans focuses
on workers who terminate service prior to retirement. The major focus of these
studies tends to be whether the funds are spent on current consumption or saved
for retirement. In comparison, this study examines the planned distributional
choices of workers who are retiring from career jobs.
A more detailed description of this project, the employer partners, and the
surveys can be found in Clark et al. (2010).
Employees could accrue no new benefits in the old plan after 2003.
In 2007, BD introduced a cash balance plan and gave workers a one-time option
of switching to the cash balance plan. Virtually all older workers with significant
tenure would have had higher values in the old plan, and thus would have chosen
to stay in the old plan.
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